Security and trust

An agent reads files and runs commands, so what it reads can be hostile: a repository you just cloned, a web page, a tool result. Seshat is built so that the safe behaviour is the default and loosening it is a decision you take.

Project files are not trusted until you say so

The terminal interface reads its configuration from your own files, and also from the project: .seshat.json or seshat.json (from the working directory up to the git root) and .seshat/seshat.json. A cloned repository can carry any of them.

Some sections run something or send something somewhere, so they are ignored until the project is trusted:

Section	Why it is held back
mcp / mcpServers	A stdio MCP server is a command line started when Seshat opens
hooks	Shell commands run on tool events
lsp	Language servers are programs
providers	A base URL decides who receives your API key
permissions	allowed_tools removes the permission questions
image_generation, text_to_speech, speech_to_text	Endpoints and keys
options.context_paths, options.skills_paths	They can send any file of the machine to the model provider, or add instructions

Models, display options and disabled tools still apply. Your own configuration, in the runtime folder, is never restricted. When something is ignored, the interface shows a warning at startup.

seshat trust              # trust this project's configuration files as they are now
seshat trust --status     # list the files, their state and what they hold
seshat trust --untrust    # withdraw the trust

Trust is recorded for the content of each file (its SHA-256). If a pull changes a file, it has to be trusted again.

The .env file of the working directory

Seshat also reads a .env in the folder where it starts. An entry is ignored, with a warning, when:

• its value contains a shell substitution ($(...) or a backquote);
• its name decides what runs or where Seshat looks for its configuration: PATH, SHELL, HOME, LD_*, GIT_*, NODE_OPTIONS, SESHAT_RUNTIME_ROOT, SESHAT_BASH_* and a few others.

Keys, models and URLs are still read. If a *_BASE_URL points outside your machine, Seshat applies it but prints a warning that names the server which will receive your requests and their API key.

Secrets stay out of the commands the model runs

The bash tool, background commands and the terminal’s shell no longer inherit the whole environment. Variables whose name says secret (*_API_KEY, *_TOKEN, *_SECRET, *_PASSWORD, DATABASE_URL…), the families used by the providers, and values that plainly look like credentials are removed. PATH, HOME, the locale, proxies and build settings stay.

Setting	Effect
SESHAT_BASH_ENV_ALLOW=NAME,PREFIX_*	Keep the variables you name, for a command that really needs GITHUB_TOKEN
SESHAT_BASH_INHERIT_ENV=true	Go back to passing the whole environment

The local network is off limits to web_fetch

The web fetch tool refuses loopback, private, link-local, carrier-grade NAT and multicast addresses, IPv4 addresses hidden in NAT64 addresses, and cloud metadata names, both before and after DNS resolution. A page cannot tell the agent to read your router or a cloud metadata endpoint.

The gRPC server is closed by default

cmd/grpc listens on 127.0.0.1. To listen elsewhere you must give it a token, or explicitly accept the risk:

Setting	Meaning
SESHAT_GRPC_HOST	Address to listen on. Anything other than loopback needs a token, or the server refuses to start
SESHAT_GRPC_AUTH_TOKEN	With it, every call except HealthCheck needs authorization: Bearer <token>
SESHAT_GRPC_TLS_CERT, SESHAT_GRPC_TLS_KEY	Turn TLS on
SESHAT_GRPC_ALLOW_STDIO_MCP=true	Allow ConnectMCP to start a stdio server. Refused by default
SESHAT_GRPC_ALLOW_INSECURE_REMOTE=true	Listen on a non-local address with no token. Not recommended

Permissions

On top of all this, every sensitive action goes through the permission system. See the permission modes.